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I. INTRODUCTION
Although American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) have existed for over 60 years,
dramatic changes in world economics and the flow of investment capital across international
boundaries require a review of the ADR and its regulatory framework. Investment
opportunities abound in the modem world economy.' Even at the turn of the century,
investors recognized the great potential in extending the reach of their investment strategies,
and they were eager to participate in foreigisecurities markets and in offerings of foreign
securities in the United States. However, in addition to cultural differences, language
barriers, and time lags, American investors who traded in foreign securities faced risks,
delays, inconvenience, and transaction costs that were not typical of U.S. securities
transactions.
2
As the drawbacks to foreign-issued securities became more apparent, a common interest
developed among investors, facilitators, and regulators in creating a system that would allow
international investment in foreign securities while limiting the accompanying pitfalls. Early
deposit agreements and substitution certificates of generic composition were developed to
accommodate international finance and investment in foreign securities. The need for a
1. For example, in an EEC Council Directive of March 17, 1980, the EEC adopted a proposal regarding
uniform securities listing, distribution, and reporting requirements. In the opening paragraphs of the Directive,
the Council stated that:
the market in which undertakings operate has been enlarged to embrace the whole Community and
this enlargement involves a corresponding increase in their financial requirements and extension of
the capital markets on which they must call to satisfy them... [and that] exchange restrictions on the
purchase of securities traded on the stock exchanges of another Member State have been eliminated
as part of the libeialization of capital movements....
Thus, this measure in liberalizing EEC regulations stemmed in part from the Community's recognition that
transnational investment strategies were arising in satisfaction of the needs for international flow of funds
through the international market. Council Directive 80/390/EEC, Coordinating the Requirements for the Drawing
Up, Scrutiny and Distribution of the Listing Particulars to Be Published for the Admission of Securities to
Official Stock Exchange Listing, I Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1731 (Mareh 17, 1980); Commission Issues
Policy Statement on International Securities Regulation, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rpt. (BNA) 1753 (Nov. 18, 1988).
2. Regis Moxley, The ADR: An Instrument of International Finance and a Tool of Arbitrage, 8 VILL.
L. R V. 19, 20 (1962). Differences in the safeguards for investor protection and reporting requirements have
been recognized as contributing not only to repression of securities issuers, but also to hindering investors (or
potential investors) fron participating in foreign direct equity investment and thereby inhibiting the financing
of businesses throughout the European Community. Council Directive 80/380 EEC, Coordinating the
Requirements for the Drawing Up, Scrutiny and Distribution of the Listing Particulars to Be Published for the
Admission of Securities to Official Stock Exchange Listing, 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 1731 (March 17,
1983). See Note, SEC Regulation ofAmerican Depositary Receipts: Disclosure LTD., 65 YALE LJ. 861 (1956).
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uniform system to facilitate trading in foreign securities culminated in the birth of the ADR.A
Since the birth of ADRs in 1927, they have become the most widely used vehicle for
trading foreign securities in the U.S.4 ADRs are negotiable receipts which evidence the
deposit of foreign securities. The underlying securities are deposited with a bank, typically
its foreign branch or affiliate, and the bank, acting as the depositary, issues receipts
representing the securities to investors. The receipts are typically freely transferrable,
normally traded on the NASDAQ over-the-counter market. Although they are not stock
certificates in and of themselves, the receipts are similar to the extent they are traded in much
the same way as their security counterparts.5
The ADR, as a vehicle for trading in foreign securities, has several distinct advantages
over direct equity trading in traditional foreign securities. First, they avoid the complications
in the initial purchase of foreign securities caused by the lack of timely bid quotations. Even
on the domestic securities market, bid prices quoted in various media channels will differ on
a given day between New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles.6 In the international markets,
quotations are significantly more perplexing, due to untimely transmission and the fact that
they are published in a variety of forms that render such quotations difficult to understand.7
Second, direct equity investment in foreign securities may be subject to various foreign
transfer restrictions which control their purchase and resale, as well as physical
transportation of the stock certificates.
In addition to these disadvantages, fluctuating exchange rates and high transportation
costs increase the expense and delay of obtaining the proceeds from the sale of foreign
securities. Although efforts are underway to improve clearance and settlement practices
across international borders, no precise design has emerged to solve these problems.8 In
June 1989, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan addressed members of the
Senate Banking Securities Subcommittee on the subject of trends in globalized securities
markets. Greenspan noted that there is a "systematic risk" in clearance and settlement (C/S)
delays.9 In the U.S., the maximum CIS window period is five days.'" Greenspan warned
that any float period in excess of five days introduces significant threats to investment in
securities."
The foreign corporate practice of issuing bearer certificates adds further difficulties to
foreign direct equity investments. Since holders of the bearer certificates have no direct
contact with the foreign corporation, no information relating directly to corporate activities
3. The true ADR was developed primarily by the Guaranty Trust Company of New York in cooperation
with several prominent domestic and foreign arbitrage brokers and stock exchanges. Moxley, supra note 2, at
22.
4. Jonathan Royston, The Regulation of American Depositary Receipts: Americanization of the
International Capital Markets, 10 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REo. 87 (1985).
5. A depositary share is defined by the SEC as "a security, evidenced by an [ADR], that represents a
foreign security or a multiple of or fraction thereof deposited with a depositary." 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1984).
6. Macklin, NASDAQ Experience and Emerging 24-Hour Global Equity Market, Current Developments
in International Securities, Commodities and Financial Futures Markets 102-3, Singapore Conferences on
International Business Law, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore (1987).
7. Id.
8. NASAA Calls For Focus On International Clearance, 21 See. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) 277 (Feb.
17, 1989).
9. Global Markets' Interdependence Makes Them More Vulnerable, Greenspan Warns, 21 SEC. REo.
& L. REP. (BNA) 877 (June 16, 1989).
10. Id
11. Id
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such as meetings, dividend declarations, merger and takeover quests, and potential
reorganizations reaches the equity holder. In response, the investor must rely heavily on
trade publications of foreign origin, hoping that the information received is timely.12 By
contrast, within the framework of ADRs the depositary banks and their affiliates coordinate
their efforts to process and disseminate timely information. Moreover, registration of ADRs
requires that the depositary specify in the registration statement those provisions of the
deposit agreement which relate to voting procedures, dividend distributions, and circulation
of notices and proxy solicitations, along with other information of similar interest to an
equity holder. 3 Thus, by eliminating, or at least significantly reducing, the problems with
investing directly in foreign securities, the ADR became a welcome transactional vehicle.
Current trends in international securities trading lean towards complete globalization
through highly sophisticated electronic processing and market linkages. 4 As global trading
increases and its technical difficulties are overcome, computer networks between major
investment banks located in major financial centers will gradually replace national securities
exchanges.15 In an address to the Senate committee, Chairman Greenspan stated that
although the development of electronic systems for the execution of orders and for
verification, clearance, and settlement on a real time basis has progressed, such systems are
extremely expensive.' 6 Even as development of these systems continues, the integration
of international financial markets depends significantly on similar trading systems between
participating markets, mutual confidence in regulatory agencies, and reciprocity in
enforcement procedures.17
12. 2 Louis Loss & JOEL SELGMAN, SECuRITIES REGULATION 774 n.72 (3d ed. 1989); Moxlcy, supra
note 2, at 21.
13. See infra notes 101-105 and accompanying text.
14. For example, the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and te
Midwest Stock Exchange (MSE) established an international trading link in efforts to gain efficiency and
liquidity through coordinating their markets. With the linkage system TSE members are able to direct orders for
inter-listed securities from the TSE trading floor to the AMEX trading floor for execution in U.S. dollars and
complete the transaction within 30 seconds. Conversely, U.S. AMEX members can direct orders through the TSE
exchange with only slight delays arising out of currency exchange rate equalization. Beck, INTERNATIONAL
TRADiNo: TRADING LINKS BETWEEN TORONTO STOCK EXCHANGE, AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE AND MIDWEST
STOCK ExcHANGE, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES, COMMODITIES AND FINANCIAL
FuTuREs MARKETS 111-12, Singapore Conferences on International Business Law, Faculty of Law, National
University of Singapore, 1987.
In another pivotal milestone, on February 2, 1989, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission granted
approval of the"Globex System,- a computerized trading network for automated after-hours trading. The Globex
system was introduced through joint efforts of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and Reuters Information
System, Inc. Globex allows various clearing, auditing, compliance, market surveillance, and information
dissemination functions to be carried out after hours. Initially, Globex was designed to handle futures contracts
for the Australian dollar, British pound, Canadian dollar, Deutsche mark, Swiss franc, French franc, Japanese
yen, Eurodollar, U.S. T-bills, and gold. Leslie Hasking, Chief Executive and Director of the Sydney Futures
Exchange and William Brodsky, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange,
made a joint announcement that the two exchanges had reached an agreement in principle to admit the Sydney
Futures Exchange as a partner in the Globex system. Sydney Futures Exchange to Join CME's Automated
Trading Network, 21 See. Reg. & L. Rpt. (BNA) 253 (Feb. 10, 1989).
15. Beck, supra note 14, quoting from a speech by Van Agtnael, Division Chief of the Financial
Operations Department of the World Bank.
16. Global Markers' Interdependence Makes Them More Vulnerable, Greenspan Warns, 21 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rpt. (BNA) 877 (June 16, 1989). See Macklin, supra note 6, at 102-3.
17. Beck, supra note 14, at 111-19.
. 1993 /Exploring American Depositary Receipts
Notwithstanding the efforts towards harmonization of international equity investment,
various intricate obstacles still exist. Of particular importance are the generally obscure
remedial measures that protect investors in the international markets. As the interplay
between international economic interests constantly increases, the ADR process is one
vehicle that closes the investment gap between nations. However, a serious problem in
closing the gap on investor protection remains. This Article reviews the ADR arrangement,
provides an overview of relevant SEC regulations, the Glass-Steagall Act, and interpretive
cases, and analyzes the bewildering problems related to registration integrity and investor
protection. Underlying the research and preparation of this Article is the belief that the ADR
will play a continuing role in the vitality of international finance, permitting international
investors to participate in opportunities which have been unmanageable or unavailable to
most people.
II. AN OvERvIEw OF ADRs AND ADR REGULATION
A. ADR Practice and Participation in ADRs
ADRs 5 are negotiable receipts issued by a U.S. bank or trust company, the depositary,
to evidence ownership of a stated number of shares of the securities of a foreign company
that the company or shareholder has deposited with the depositary's branch office, affiliate,
or agent in the foreign country. 19 ADRs, which were originally developed for equity
securities, are now also available for debt securities." ADRs are typically registered in the
name of the U.S. holder, and they represent depositary shares which are traded on the
NASDAQ over-the-counter market in the U.S.
21
18. Amidst the turmoil of several decades of definition, interpretation, and clarification of the meaning
of "security," the ADR has been one of the strange breeds of securities that has resisted the turbulent definition
process. The definitions of"security" contained in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 are nearly identical. Compare the Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 U.S.C.S. § 77b(1) with the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C.S. § 78c(a)(10). Inasmuch as the definitions are so similar,
the courts have held that the definition of security should be construed the same under both Acts. Fargo Partners
v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1976), Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,682; United California Bank v. THC
Financial Corp., 557 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1977), Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,125; Oxford Finance Cos. v.
Harvey, 385 F. Supp. 431 (E.D. Pa. 1974), Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,942.
A variety of challenges have surfaced over the years in efforts to interpret the true meaning of "security."
In 1946, the U.S. Supreme Court developed the Howey test ("... [the question is] whether the scheme involves
an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others.") which
still dominates in securities definitional analysis. S.E.C. v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). Since that
time, the standard itself has been interpreted and clarified. There should be no doubt, by statutory definition or
judicial interpretation, that ADRs qualify as "securities- under current standards. See Moxley, supra note 2, at
20. Both the Securities Act of 1933 (SA) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA) include the phrase
.certificate of deposit for a security" in the definition of a security. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 U.S.C.S.
§ 77b(l) (Law. Co-op. 1991); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C.S. § 78c(a)(10) (Law. Co-
op. 1991).
19. Royston, supra note 4.
20. Moxley, supra note 2, at 33.
21. The terms depositary shares and depositary receipts are not synonymous. The depositary share is the
underlying security and the depositary receipt is the certificate representing the depositary share, i.e., evidence
that a deposit has been made. For a simplified analogy, a passbook savings record (analogous to the ADR)
evidences funds deposited with a bank (analogous to the deposited shares).
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ADR transferability stems from the depositary's status as the legal owner of the
underlying securities. ADRs are initially issued in the U.S., in registered form only, upon
cabled instructions from a foreign custodian of the deposit.22 The depositary issues the
ADR and maintains a registry of the ADR holders. Thereafter, transfers occur at two levels.
First, any transfers of the underlying security, which normally occur on the foreign
exchange, are accomplished by the depositary without effect on the ADR holders.23 Thus,
the depositary, rather than the ADR holder, deals with the complications of the transfer on
the foreign market which involve, as discussed above, time consuming and unfamiliar
transfer procedures, time lags for clearance and settlement, and exchange controls.
Secondly, ADR sales on the U.S. market are transacted in much the same way as
American securities. The ADR is simply endorsed in blank and transferred to the purchaser.
The transfer is accomplished at the office of the depositary in a manner similar to the transfer
of domestic securities. The foreign correspondent or affiliate bank, on behalf of the
depositary bank, actively watches for announcements of dividend declarations, collects any
dividends, converts them to U.S. currency, and transfers them to the ADR holder's account,
less any applicable fees.'
The foreign branch or affiliate of the depositary bank also acts as a local information
network.'- As legal owner of the securities, the depositary bank, through its foreign branch
or affiliate, receives all legal notices and correspondence from the issuer to its shareholders.
Additionally, the foreign branch or affiliate can easily translate reports of local trade
publications and investment advisory syndications, which are often in the language of the
country of origin, and relay them in useful form to the ADR holder.26
The foreign corporation issuing the securities does not necessarily participate in the
arrangement. The depositary may have no direct connection with the corporation other than
appearing on its records as a shareholder. The primary contractual relationship is not
between the ADR holder and the corporation, but rather between the holder and the
depositary bank. Although formal contracts or depositary agreements originally were
prepared to memorialize the relationship between the depositary and the ADR holder,
modem ADR arrangements include the terms of the arrangement on the ADR certificate
itself.
27
22. Moxley, supm2 note 2, at 23.
23. In such an arramgement, there is a significant reduction in the applicability of foreign inheritance taxes
and probate complications.
24. Moxley, supra note 2, at 23. If the holder wishes, he can make a direct sale of the underlying security
on the foreign market, surrender the corresponding ADR, and have the related foreign security released to his
designee. Id
25. The Depositary investigates the character and standing of the company, but does not warrant the
corporations' integrity or stability, nor make any recommendations. Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 234 (1983).
26. Loss & SELoMAN, supra note 12, at 774. Note that the system now allows for 3-way arbitrage of
ADRs. Original issues of the shares are deposited with a custodian in the country of origin. Depositary receipts
may then be issued simultaneously with foreign affiliates, for example in the U.S. and the U.K. or other
countries offering ADRs or equivalent regulator systems for international trading of such certificates. l
27. Loss, supra note 25, at 247.
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B. An Overview of ADR Regulation
1. The Voluntarism Principle
ADRs are classified as securities and as such are subject to SEC registration
requirements.28 In relation to these requirements, there are two theoretical forms of
offerings subject to SEC scrutiny: offerings involving voluntary entry into U.S. securities
markets and offerings of involuntary entry.29 This concept, generally referred to as the
voluntarism principle, stems from the SEC's recognition of the special problems related to
foreign securities."
In 1981, the SEC officially recognized the efforts of the European Economic
Community (EEC), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
the United Nations (UN), and the International Accounting Standards Committee in working
toward the formulation of guidelines for uniform international disclosure standards.31 By
1985, the EEC adopted a system for the harmonization of regulations concerning
undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS). A directive issued
in Brussels on November 18, 1985, stated that those efforts
... intended to establish minimum common rules concerning the authorization,
supervision, structure and investment policy of UCITS which fall within the scope
of the directive and concerning the information they must publish.32
The purpose of the directive was to ensure equal protection for investors and to harmonize
the conditions of competition between UCITS. The EEC intended to accomplish this end
by minimizing transborder regulation and substituting the principle of "supervision by the
country of origin." "
The SEC's original policy and the legislative intent behind the Securities Act was that
foreign private issuers should be treated the same as domestic issuers.34 The SEC's
voluntarism principle arose out of a dichotomy of investor protection and the identical
treatment policy, on the one hand, and the desire to further investment opportunities, on the
other. In the SEC's view, subjecting foreign non-voluntary issuers to the same registration
requirements as domestic issuers would stifle and restrict the flow of international
commerce.33 At the same time, if strict registration requirements were imposed and if
foreign securities were restricted, U.S. investors would channel their foreign investments
through foreign securities exchanges, where disclosure requirements may be grossly
28. Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 77b(1)-(15) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
29. SEC Securities Act Rel. No. 6360 [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,054,
at 84,643 (Nov. 20, 1981) [hereinafter SEC Rel. 6360].
30. Id at 84,643.
31. Id at 24 SEC Dock. 3, 6 (1981).
32. Coordination of Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities to Promote
European Capital Market, Press Release of the Council of European Communities, No. 10429/85 (Presse 173),
Brussels, November 18, 1985, [New Developments Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $10,741.
33. Id
34. Hearings on S. 875 Before the Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 89-90 (1933);
Hearings on H.R 4314 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73rd Cong., Ist Sess.
12-13 (1933).
35. SEC Rel. 6360, supra note 29, at 84,645.
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inadequate. Thus, an overly strict regulatory scheme would undermine the protection that
the SEC hastens to provide to investors. The SEC effected a compromise of the two
positions by a slightly more lenient registration process for foreign non-voluntary issuers.36
2. Voluntary versus Non-Voluntary Entry
In one instance, a foreign issuer may not be involved in the depositary arrangement
when a foreign dealer or shareholder deposits securities with the depositary. Similarly, the
depositary may solicit deposits of shares against the proposed issuance of ADRs. Under
these circumstances, the issuer is deemed to have not voluntarily entered the U.S. market.37
When there is no voluntary entry, registration should be much more lenient than for foreign
issuers who directly initiate public offerings or trade their securities on the U.S. market. 8
However, when the foreign issuer is the sponsor of the ADR arrangement as the principle
depositor, it is subject to greater SEC control. This additional control is essentially a
bootstrap link to Section 11 liability of issuers.39 Thus, under the instructions to Form F-6,
a foreign issuer who sponsors an ADR arrangement must sign the registration statement,
40
thereby activating Section 11 liability protection against itself.
I. BANKS, BANKiNG, AND REGULATION: How MANY
HATS CAN ONE BANK WEAR?
An analysis of the history of banking and securities regulation reveals that the regulation
of neither industry is clear, and that although attempts have been made to segregate the two
industries, accomplishing that goal poses difficult problems reachable only after serious
compromise. The SEC once tended to allow banks to go about the business of banking
without substantial interference. Generally, banks were exempt from SEC registration and
36. Id.
37. The SEC's position on voluntary entry into the U.S. market is that foreign issuers that list securities
on a U.S. exchange or undertake to make a public offering have voluntarily entered into the U.S. securities
markets. SEC Rel. 6360, supra note 29, at 84,643.
38. Royston, supra note 4, at 89.
39. See infra notes 85-96 and accompanying text (relating to the "issuer dilemma").
40. Form F-6, 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), 7001 at 6161 (1988) (Adopted in Rel. No. 33-6459,
83,329, March 18, 1983, effective March 24, 1983,48 Fed. Reg. 12346). If the foreign issuer is also the sponsor
of the ADRs, in addition to the issuer signing the ADR registration, the principal executive officers, chief
financial officer, controller or principal accounting officer, a majority of the board of directors, and the issuer's
authorized U.S. representative must also sign the registration statement. Id. For an analysis of ADR registration,
see infra notes 96-119 and accompanying text.
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reporting requirements, even though they frequently transgressed into the securities arena."
Those days, however, are largely gone.
A. The Bankers' Exemption: Section 3(a)(2)
The passage of the Securities Act of 1933 permitted banks to issue securities, within
specified limits, under Section 3(a)(2) without complying with registration requirements.42
Through various amendments, the act's correlated legislative history indicates that Congress
intended a broad application of this Section 3(a)(2) exemption. Restrictive and conservative
Supreme Court decisions gave rise to the Congressional debate linked to Section 3(a)(2)'s
"public instrumentality" and"essential government functions" provisions.4 3 The result was
an expanded view by Congress and the SEC of the exemption, but an important issue
remained unresolved until 1955. Before 1955, banks were in a quandary over whether the
Section 3(a)(2) exemption applied only to their own securities or also to voting trusts, deposit
certificates, and other trust certificates under which thebankacted as trustee, controlling the
management of the trust assets." The controversy encompassed the question of whether
ADRs were within Section 3(a)(2)'s exempt classification. The focus of the analysis shifted,
however, to the question of whether the bank was to be defined as the issuer in trust
certificate and ADR arrangements.
B. The Glass-Steagall Act
In many areas of banking and securities regulation, the Comptroller of the Currency and
the SEC are clashing titans attempting to conquer the territory of regulation which is
rightfully theirs. In the last several decades, the territory which each claimed has overlapped
significantly. The Banking Act of 1933, or the Glass-Steagall Act,45 was Congress' effort
to compartmentalize various areas of the banking industry, particularly banking and
investment banking. As will be discussed further, the Glass-Steagall Act has continued to
41. In 1924 Rep. McFadden (Pa.), Chairman of the House Committee on Banking and Currency,
promoted a bill that was designed to liberalize the branch banking system. Recognizing the interplay between
the banking industry and the securities industry, Rep. McFadden stated to the Senate Banking and Currency
Committee:
It has been said that we are permitting national banks to engage in a new business without
proper safeguards .... [N]ational banks have for many years been engaged in the business of buying
and selling investment securities without any restrictions whatsoever .... [Security affiliates] are
found in every national bank .... The authority is from Section 5136 [of the Federal Reserve Act]
... empowering national banks to negotiate "other evidences of debt" .... Modem banking requires
the conduct of an investment securities business.
Hearings on the Consolidation of National Banking Associations, Subcom. Sen. Banking and Currency Com.,
& 1782, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1926).
42. 15 U.S.C.S. § 77c(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1991) exempts securities issued or guaranteed by a bank,
including securities issued or guaranteed by a "public instrumentality" which performs "essential government
functions."
43. As Senator Fletcher stated, conservative courts "refused to regard as 'essential governmental
functions' such activities as the furnishing of light, transportation, power, and even water." H.R. Rep. No. 1838,
73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1934).
44. After 1934 amendments to Section 3(a)(2), the exemption extended to "any security issued by or
representing an interest in or a direct obligation of a Federal Reserve Bank." Former versions applied to "... any
such security issued by any national bank." See 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 12, at vol. I1, 1156, n.36.
45. 48 Stat. 162, codified at 12 U.S.C.S. §§ 2, 3, & 6 (Law. Co-op. 1992).
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be a motivation benchmark for change and redefinition of the role which banks play in
today's investment arena.
1. Divorce and Reconciliation of Commercial and Investment Banking
Courts and scholars often refer to the Glass-Steagall Act as the divorce of commercial
banks and investment banks,4" which divorce was in fact Congress' intent.47 Before the
passage of the Glass-Steagall Act, commercial banks regularly participated in securities
underwriting through affiliates and trust companies. 48 The picture changed in 1933 with
the new distinction drawn between essentially two separate service areas of banking. The
following section discusses the main portions of the Glass-Steagall Act that apply directly
to securities related-services offered by banks, and how the courts expanded and contracted
the role of banks in securities services.
a. Section 24(7): The Separation Provision
Section 24 is the primary "separation" statute.49 It essentially separates banks from
investment institutions and defines, almost ad nauseam, the powers of banks in its extremely
lengthy text, especially part seven. The part of Section 24(7) pertinent to this discussion,
addressing the powers of banks, provides as follows:
Seventh. To exercise by its board of directors or duly authorized officers or agents,
subject to law, all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the
business of banking; by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills
of exchange, and other evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and
selling exchange, coin, and bullion; by loaning money on personal security; and by
obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes according to the provisions of title 62 of
the Revised Statutes. The business of dealing in securities and stock by the
association shall be limited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock
without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in
no case for its own account, and the association shall not underwrite any issue of
securities or stock .... 50
Thus, this section defines the parameters for banks in their association with the securities
industry. While creating a minimal operating space for banks to buy or sell securities only
for customers' accounts, it still prevents banks from fully entering into securities and
underwriting for its account.
46. "Demand for divorcing banking and securities activities followed in the wake of the stock market
crash of 1929." Securities Industry Ass'n. v. Federal Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir. 1988).
47. See generally Edwin Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History, 88
BANKING LJ. 483, 505 (1971).
48. Id.
49. 12 U.S.C.S. § 24 (Law. Co-op. 1992).
50. 12 U.S.C.S. § 24 (Law. Co-op. 1992) (Seventh).
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b. Section 78: The Exclusion Provision
Section 78 is an exclusion statute that prohibits banks from employing securities dealers
and underwriters." This is the second tier of statutory separation excluding banks from
actively trading in securities. Under Section 24(7), banks could not engage in the business
of securities. Section 78 enlarges that prohibition. The text of Section 78 provides:
No officer, director, or employee of any corporation or unincorporated association,
no partner or employee of any partnership, and no individual, primarily engaged in
the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution, at wholesale or retail,
or through syndicate participation, of stocks, bonds, or other similar securities, shall
serve the same time as an officer, director, or employee of any member bank except
in limited classes of cases in which the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System may allow such service by general regulations when in the judgment of the
said Board it would not unduly influence the investment policies of such member
bank or the advice it gives its customers regarding investments.52
The apparent purpose behind enacting this section was to create a safety valve by not
allowing banks to obtain the proper tools necessary to engage in securities trading.
c. Sections 377 and 378: The Criminal Prohibitions
Sections 377 and 378 criminalize transgressions by bankers into the sale and
underwriting of securities. More precisely, Section 377 prohibits banks from affiliating with
brokers, dealers, and underwriters, on pain of daily fines and possible revocation of their
banking charter.53 Section 378 is the commercial banking counterpart of Section 377.
Section 378 criminalizes participation in commercial banking by brokers, dealers and
underwriters, establishing daily fines and imprisonment for violations.54
51. 12 U.S.C.s. § 78 (Law. Co-op. 1992).
52. Id.
53. The text of Section 377, in pertinent part, provides:
[N]o member bank shall be affiliated in any manner.., with any corporation, association, business
trusts, or other similar organization engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public
sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail or through syndicate participation of stocks, bends,
debentures, notes, or other securities.
12 U.S.C.S. § 377 (Law. Co-op. 1992).
54. The text of Section 378 is as follows:
(a) [WIt shall be unlawful -
(1) For any person, firm, corporation, association, business trust, or other similar organization,
engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing, at wholesale or retail, or
through syndicate participation, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities, to engage at the
same time to any extent whatever in the business of receiving deposits subject to check or to
repayment upon presentation of a passbook, certificate of deposit, or other evidence of debt, or upon
request of the depositor Provided, that the provisions of this paragraph shall not prohibit national
banks or State banks or trust companies (whether or not members of the Federal Reserve System)
or other financial institutions or private bankers from dealing in, underwriting, purchasing, and selling
investment securities, or issuing securities to the extent permitted to national banking associations
by the provisions of section 24 of this title.
12 U.S.C.S. § 378 (Law. Co-op. 1992). "Investment securities" referred to in Section 378 are primarily
government securities. These include U.S. Treasury bonds, state and municipal bonds, federal and state housing
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2. The Subtle Hazards Doctrine
The courts have not been consistent in establishing the permissible boundaries of the
role of banks engaging in securities-related services. In Investment Co. Institute v. Camp,5"
the Supreme Court analyzed the scope of the Glass-Steagall Act and determined that a bank
which participated in the offering of mutual fund units violated the commercial bank and
investment bank separation statutes.56 In Camp, the First National City Bank of New York
obtained approval of the Comptroller of the Currency to establish and operate a collective
investment fund. The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) launched an attack
on the Comptroller's authorization, claiming that the approval violated various provisions
of the Glass-Steagall Act. Rejecting the Comptroller's argument to permit banks to
participate in mutual ftind offerings, the Court cut to the heart of Congressional intent behind
the Glass-Steagall Act. As the Court stated:
The Glass-Steagall Act shows that Congress... repeatedly focused on the more
subtle hazards that arise when a commercial bank goes beyond the business of
acting as a fiduciary or managing agent and enters the investment banking business
either directly or by establishing an affiliate to hold and sell particular
investments.57
The subtle hazards of which the Court spoke is a standard by which courts and
regulators can assess the integrity of a bank under a variety of circumstances. In Camp, the
Court identified a number of such hazards. First, the relationship between a commercial
bank and its investment bank or securities affiliate is too close for the practical separation
of one's hardships from the other's hardships.58 The Court evidently believed that if its
affiliate failed, the bank would be compelled to resurrect the affiliate through unstable loans.
Second, Congress enacted the statute in part because of strong investor reliance on the
association between the bank and the affiliate, so that if heavy losses occurred, customers
would quickly abandon a bank that might be in critical need of customer confidence.5 9
Third, if banks were open to the promotional opportunities of investment banking, they could
too easily promote substandard loans to direct funds towards securities purchases. 60
Finally, the Court concluded that banks or their affiliates which found themselves in the
precarious position ofneeding to bail out of a securities issue catastrophe would be overly
tempted to adopt a self-preserving philosophy, leaving their customers holding the bag.6'
The subtle hazards standard remains as an integrity bench mark for the determination of
whether banks should engage in certain securities activities. Essentially, in any given set of
and education loan guarantee institutions, and limited corporate debt instruments. Id.
55. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
56. The Court concluded that "[t]he literal terms of [the Glass-Steagall] Act clearly prevent what the
Comptroller has sought to authorize here .... We conclude that the operation of an investment fund ...
involves a bank in the underwriting, issuing, selling and distributing of securities in violation of ... the Glass-
Steagall Act." Ma at 640.
57. Ma at 631 (emphasis added).
58. Id at 632 (noting that the failure of the Bank of the U.S. in 1930 was due, in part, to its extensive
affiliation to securities).
59. Id
60. Id at 633.
61. Id at 634.
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circumstances, it enables courts to assess whether a bank is acting in its proper capacity,
either as a fiduciary or as a managing agent, or whether it is going beyond prescribed limits
into the investment banking business, thereby violating the statutory restrictions.
In 1981, ten years after Camp, the Supreme Court considered, in Board of Governors,
Etc. v. Inv. Co. Institute,62 whether the services of an investment adviser to a closed-end
investment company were within permissible limits of banking, so that a bank holding
company could own the investment company. The Federal Reserve Board took the position
in the suit that the connection between a bank holding company and an affiliate investment
advisor was permissible because the investment advisor's activities were "so closely related
to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto."63 Passing
on the Reserve Board's position, the Supreme Court analyzed various provisions of the Bank
Holding Act.' Although the Reserve Board pointed out the strong similarities between this
case and Camp, the Court felt that closed-end investment shares were an entirely different
class of securities. The Court distinguished closed-end investment shares on the basis of
their being securities that "are not issued, sold, or underwritten by the investment
advisors."6" By contrast, the share units in the mutual fund considered in Camp qualified
distinctly as a security issued and sold by the bank. In the Court's view, Congress probably
did not intend for managing customer accounts to be "investment banking," rather than
"commercial banking,"' and it seemed to believe that investment advisors were engaged
in the business of advising, not issuing or underwriting. Thus, their principal business was
fairly within the authorized activity of bank holding companies.
In 1984, the Supreme Court considered Bank of America's acquisition of Charles
Schwab & Company.67 A controversy arose out of an attempt by the Securities Industry
Association (SIA) to block the acquisition. The SIA argued that such a merger of a
commercial bank and a securities brokerage was clearly prohibited by the BankHolding Act
and the Glass-Steagall Act. The Court countered, however, that the business of discount
brokers, such as Schwab, is "essentially confined to the purchase and sale of securities for
the account of third parties, and without the provision of investment advice to the purchaser
or seller."68 This view was in agreement with the Federal Reserve Board's finding that
Schwab was not principally engaged in any prohibited activities that would bar the
acquisition. The Court held that the public sale of securities relates to the issue, flotation,
underwriting, and distribution of securities, none of which were involved in discount
brokerage. The Court further held that none of the subtle hazards identified in Camp existed
in the proposed acquisition of Schwab. Because Schwab acts only as an agent in the transfer
of securities, the investor was not subject to the dangers arising from the subtle hazards of
the securities industry.'
However, the SIA continued to press its arguments against commercial banks. In 1986
the SIA again challenged the Federal Reserve Board. In the commercial paper case,70 the
62. 450 U.S. 46, 53 (1981).
63. IL
64. iL
65. Ad at 67.
66. Id at 64.
67. Securities Industry Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 207, 220 (1984).
68. Id
69. Id
70. Securities Industry Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 807 F.2d 1052 (Cir. 1986).
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SIA challenged the authorization of Bankers Trust Company to place commercial paper
offered by third parties. The panel noted that commercial paper comprises unsecured, large
denomination promissory notes written with maturities of less than nine months and
normally issued only to large corporations in need of temporary capital flow. To reach its
conclusion that commercial paper was within the permitted activity of banks, the panel found
that the "subtle hazards" of Camp did not exist in the commercial paper offerings by third
parties. The court first noted that the most obvious hazard, the investment of bank funds in
securities, simply was not at issue in the case. It then addressed conflict of interest issues
and found that there was no link between the bank's loan interests and the commercial paper
transactions. Absent some dual specter of the bank making loans to issuers to ensure success
of its own issue, no conflict would exist.
In 1987, the Supreme Court revisited the Bank America-Schwab plan. In the facts of
Clarke v. Securities Industry Association,7 ' Security Pacific National Bank applied to the
Comptroller for permission to establish an affiliation with a Discount Brokerage firm.
Before the District Court, the SIA attempted to block the affiliation, again arguing that the
Glass-Steagall Act prohibits national banks from offering discount brokerage services.72
The District Court rejected the argument and the Supreme Court did not reach the issue
because the SIA did not pursue it on appeal.7 3 Placing the cases discussed on a continuum
of separation between commercial banks and investment banks reveals the interesting point
that no matter how steadfastly the securities industry has pressed for the complete separation
of commercial and investment banking, the Federal Reserve Board, with the aid of the
courts, has gradually opened the door to their reconciliation.
3. The Financial Modernization Act of 1988
Congress also has taken steps to reconcile commercial and investment banks. Although
the Glass-Steagall Act is by no means dead and gone, signs of change are apparent. In 1988,
the Senate passed the Proxmire Financial Modernization Act of 1988 by a vote of 94-2.74
In an account of the bill, Senator Wirth75 stated that in view of regulating the banking and
securities industries, "... an emerging and perplexing goal is to chart the U.S.' place in the
world economy. Until we mark our position more clearly, it is difficult to imagine
international financial institutions rationalizing their interrelationships."7 6 Senator Wirth
further stated that the "pothole approach" to correcting banking and securities policy and
regulation was not the answer.77 In his view, the Financial Modernization Act was a
complete overhaul of the banking industry, as well as "a measured approach to the repeal of
the Glass-Steagall Act.""
71. 479 U.S. 388 (1987) (consolidating case nos. 85-971 and 85-972).
72. Securities Industry Ass'n v. Comptroller of Curr., 758 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Securities Industry
Ass'n v. Comptroller of the Currency, 765 F.2d 1196 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
73. Clark, 479 U.S. 388.
74. See generally Introductory remarks by Senator Dixon, S.305, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 135 Cong., Rec.
S.864 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1989); see also S.1886, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 Cong. Rec. S.3520 (daily ed. Mar.
31, 1988). The Bill was introduced by Senators Dixon, Garn, Graham, and Wirth.
75. Member of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.
76. Senator Timothy Wirth, The Financial Modernization Act of 1988, 8 ANN. REv. BANKINo L. 331,
333 (1989).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 334.
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The 1988 Bill, however, never passed the House of Representatives before the October
recess. Consequently, the bill was re-introduced the following year as the Proxmire
Financial Modernization Act of 1989.!' One of the interesting aspects of the 1989 bill was
its proposed repeal of Sections 78 and 377 of the Banking Act.8 Not only would the bill
have repealed those sections, it also would have amended Section 4(c) of the Banking Acet8'
by specifically authorizing bank affiliates to engage in underwriting, distribution, brokerage,
private placement, and investment advising and to deal in securities of any type. 2 Barbara
Lucas, general counsel for Citicorp North American Investment Bank in New York,
observed that the business of securities and the business of banking has become "one in the
same," and that the trend in this direction is irreversible.3
The Financial Modernization Act brings banking and securities policy full circle. When
the Federal Reserve Board attempted to close the gap between commercial banks and
investment banks, the securities industry objected. Even so, the courts have tended to
comply with the Board's wishes. As the title of the Bill denotes, the banking industry is in
need of modernization through regulation. As they developed the Financial Modernization
Act, the sponsoring Senators considered a variety of information, including a report of the
General Accounting Office (GAO) on the subject of the Glass-Steagall Act. In that report,
the GAO advised Congress that:
[i]t is worth recalling the motivation that prompted the passage of the Glass-
Steagall Act in-1933, a determination that depositors would never again face the
risks that stemmed from the near-collapse of the U.S. commercial banking system
as the Great Depression deepened in the 1930s. The original intent of Glass-
Steagall laws remains just as valid today as it did then."
Although the motivations behind the Glass-Steagall Act are timeless, the act should
accommodate the banking industry's natural progress. Neglecting the needs of a changing
industry will suffocate its usefulness. Considering these needs, the relationship between
banking and investment banking cannot be minimized. Each industry has its proper space
and expertise, and the balance of expertise and defined boundaries between the two gives rise
to the opportunity for their cooperation and coordination.
IV. SEC REGULATION
A. The Issuer Dilemma
Competing theories of the SEC and bankers creates the difficulty of determining
whether Congress intended for ADRs to be exempt under Section 3(a)(2). The question is
really two-fold. It depends first on whether the bank is an issuer whose securities are
79. S. 305, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.; 135 Cong. Rec. S. 865 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1989).
80. 12 U.S.C.S. §§ 78, 377 (Law. Co-op. 1992). For a dicussion of Sections 78 and 377, addressing
exclusions and criminal sanctions, see supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
81. 12 U.S.C.S. § 4(c) (Law. Co-op. 1992).
82. See generally S. 305, supra note 79.
83. Foreign Exchanges Plan to Sell Option Products in U.S., 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 93 (Jan.
19, 1990).
84. Wirth, supra note 76, at 334.
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exempt, with the exemption based on the regulation of banks by the Controller of the
Currency85 which therefore requires no further regulation by the SEC, and, second, on who
is responsible for Section 11 issuer liability 6 if the bank is not an issuer. SEC registration
requirements do not identify any party in the ADR arrangement which assumes the
traditional issuer liability in non-voluntary ADR issues. The foreign company is typically
uninvolved and does not sign the registration statement. However, the depositor, under a
former SEC policy, would have issuer responsibility under Section 11 because it performed
the acts and assumed the duties of managing the deposit.8 7
Under the original version of depositary arrangements, the depositor was generally an
American investment house which desired to facilitate the sale of a block of shares it owned
in a foreign company. Depositors were also foreign, and sometimes domestic, shareholders
who undertook to have their shares lodged with the depositary's foreign agent in return for
the ADRs. In the latter situation, the depositor retained control over the management of the
deposit, while the bank acted merely as the custodian of the underlying share certificates.
Under that arrangement, the depositor was clearly the issuer. However, under more modem
arrangements, it is now common for a bank to initiate an offer to issue receipts against the
deposit of designated foreign securities. Foreign corporations frequently seek depositaries
as a vehicle to enter their securities into the U.S. market.88 In arrangements in which a
bank takes away control over the deposit from the depositors, it maybe considered the issuer
under the statutory definition.89 If the depositor and depositary maintained joint control,
they may both be co-issuers. Thus, depending on the circumstances, the issuer may be the
depositor, the depositary, or both. If the statutory definitions remain intact and a bank
assumes the role of deposit manager, the issuer status should logically transfer to the bank.
Nevertheless, the SEC has expressly stated that the depositary is not the issuer.9° If the
bank is an issuer, as bankers would claim, then ADRs would be exempt from registration
requirements under section 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 193391 and therefore not subject
to the SEC's regulatory authority. ADR mechanisms themselves do not identify the party
who is the issuer and who would assume the issuer's functions of registration and periodic
reporting. Thus, the SEC lacked a party to tag with the issuer's responsibilities. Under this
dilemma, ADRs would have become an independent exempt security with no detectable
issuer identity, which obviously would be contrary to the very fiber of SEC policy.
85. It was the opion of Congress in 1933 that "adequate supervision of securities of a national bank
[was] exercised by the Controller of the Currency." H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73rd Cong., Ist Sess. 14 (1933).
86. Section 11 of the Securities Act provides a private remedy for false or misleading statements or the
omission of material information as required by the registration statement. 15 U.S.C.S. § 77k (Law. Co-op.
1991).
87. Note, SEC Regulation of American Depositary Receipts, 65 YALE W. 861, 867 (1956).
88. Royston, supra note 4, at 96.
89. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4(c) (1992); see Loss, supra note 25, at 247.
90. The instructions to Form F-6 state that "[ihe legal entity created by the agreement for the issuance
of ADRs shall sign the registration statement as the registrant. The depositary may sign on behalf of such entity,
but the depositary for the issuance of ADRs itself shall not be deemed to be an issuer.... .- Form F-6, supra
note 40. See Moxley, supra note 2, at 30; see also Loss, supra note 25, at 247.
91. Section 3(a)(2) is codified at 15 U.S.C.S. § 77c(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
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In a parallel but related situation involving trust certificates, the House Committee on
Banking and Securities expressed its view in connection with the Trust Indenture Act 2 that
if securities "issued by" banks were exempt from the Bill, it would not be possible for an
issuer to evade compliance by making a bond or mortgage with a bank and subsequently
having the bank issue certificates as evidence of the bond or mortgage. To reach this
conclusion, the Committee stated that:
Similar questions have arisen under the Securities Act, and under such
circumstances the company itself, rather than the bank which performs purely
ministerial functions, has been regarded by the Commission as the "issuer" of the
certificate of participation.93
However, the SEC believed the'better view to be that the issuer of the trust certificates was
the trust entity, rather than the trustee.
In 1955 the SEC held extensive discussions with a number of banks over whether the'
Section 3(a)(2) exemption for securities issued by a bank should apply to ADRs. The SEC
concluded that the exemption did not apply to ADRs, while it reinforced its policy that the
bank was not an issuer.9' This very issue came to the forefront of policy debate the same
year when the Irving Trust Company announced that it planned to issue ADRs representing
35 issues of securities listed on the London and Dutch stock exchanges. It intended to issue
the ADRs under the Section 3(a)(2) exemption. After the SEC considered whether or not
the exemption should apply, it filed a report to Congress which stated that:
Section 3(a)(2) was intended to provide an exemption only for a bank's own
securities. To permit a bank to claim this exemption for any trust or similar entity
that it might devise would permit the creation of voting trusts, investment trusts and
a variety of other securities for which the disclosure requirements of the Securities
Act of 1933 could be avoided. Furthermore, the concept of supervisionby banking
officials included in section 3(a)(2) did not appear to embrace the issuance of
ADRs so as to afford purchasers the protection intended by that section.95
The SEC apparently believed that ADRs were such a strange breed of security that it, rather
than the banking regulators, was better equipped to oversee such transactions.
The solution, for lack of a better description, amounted to a sidestep in theory to
conveniently avoid a mind trap. By avoiding any conclusive remedy, the SEC formally
adopted the fictional entity clause of Form F-6. The clause allows the depositary bank to
assume the issuer role, while shielding the bank and its officers from liability arising out of
the contents of the registration document. Thus, the SEC developed a combination of
92. Trust Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 77aaa et seq. (Law. Co-op. 1983 & Supp. 1992). The Trust
Indenture Act was a buttress against securities regulations. The Act provides for independent trustees under
indentures to protect and enforce the rights of securities holders issued under the Act by linking registration
under the Securities Act of 
1933.
93. H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
94. Interestingly enough, when the SEC was faced with issuer identity relating to banks in 1950, the SEC
expressed its view, at that time, that if a bank were an "issuer" in an ADR transaction, then the Section 3(a)(2)
exemption would apply. 3 Loss & SEWGMAN, supra note 12, at 1157 n.38.
95. SEC Securities Act Release 3593 [1952-1956 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,372;
22 SEC ANN. REP. 43 (1956).
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exempting banks without exempting the ADRs from registration, a non-exempt exemption
for banks which became known as the double entity theory. Under this theory the bank, as
the depositary or custodian, is the provider of a service, while the service it offers receives
an entity identity as the issuer. The theory's effect keeps anyone from issuer liability under
Section 1 1, a mystery which remains unresolved and unchallenged.
B. Registration
The registration of ADRs is separate from registration of the underlying securities. The
underlying securities may or may not be registered in the U.S. because certain exemptions
apply to foreign-issued securities.
1. ADR Registration
ADRs are registered by filing Form F-6. Under the current criteria, Form F-6 may be
used if three conditions are met:
(1) The holder of the ADRs is entitled to withdraw the deposited securities at
any time subject only to (i) temporary delays caused by closing transfer
books of the depositary or the issuer of the deposited securities or the
deposit of shares in connection with voting at a shareholders' meeting, or
the payment of dividends, (ii) the payment of fees, taxes, and similar
charges, and (iii) compliance with any laws or governmental regulations
relating to ADRs or to the withdrawal of deposited securities;
(2) The deposited securities are offered or sold in transactions registered
under the Securities Act or in transactions that would be exempt therefrom
if made in the U.S.; and
(3) As of the filing date of this registration statement, the issuer of the
deposited securities is reporting pursuant to the periodic reporting
requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 or the deposited securities are exempt therefrom by Rule 12g3-2(b)
... unless the issuer of the deposited securities concurrently files a
registration statement on another form for the deposited securities.'
The differences between ADR registration and the registration of domestic securities are
not within Form F-6, but rather are in the registration of the securities underlying the ADRs.
As noted above in paragraph (2), the deposited shares must be either offered through
transactions registered under the Securities Act or exempt from it. The registration of the
deposited securities in ADRs may be on "any other form the registrant is eligible to use,"93
which gives rise to the departure. Where domestic issuers typically file registration
96. Loss, supra note 25, at 248.
97. See Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 7001.
98. See General Instructions, Section I. B. Registration of Deposited Securities, at Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 7,002.
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statements using Forms S-1, S-2, or S-3, 99 foreign issuers register their securities using
Forms F-i, F-2, or F-3."
Although both the S series forms and the F series forms incorporate various provisions
from Regulation S-K 10 and Regulation S-X,1 °2 several requirements from Regulation
S-K are revised or omitted for F series registrants."°3 Item 1 of Regulation S-K 1 °4
requires the registration to include the complete identity of the depositary and the specific
title of the ADRs and the underlying securities represented by the ADRs. It also requires the
general terms of the deposit agreement, to include ten separate points:
(1) the conversion ratio, that is, the number of deposited securities represented
by one unit of ADR;
(2) the voting procedure applicable to the underlying securities;
(3) procedures for distribution of dividends;
(4) procedures for circulating notices, reports, and proxy solicitations;
(5) provisions for the sale or exercise of rights;
(6) provisions for the sale or deposit of any securities acquired or disposed of
due to dividends, stock splits, or reorganization;
(7) duration, amendment, or termination of the agreement;
(8) the definition of rights of ADR holders to inspect the transfer of books of
the depositary and the list of ADR holders;
(9) a description of any withdrawal restrictions applicable to the underlying
securities; and
(10) any terms which limit the liability of the depositary."°5
Item 2 requires the foreign issuer to furnish the SEC with certain public reports filed
pursuant to foreign law, or in the alternative, the information which Regulation 12g3-2(b)
99. Forms S-I, S-2, and S-3 can be found at 2 Fed.Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) I 7,121, 7,141, and 7,151,
respectively.
100. Forms F-1, F-2, and F-3 can be found at 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) TI 6,951, 6,961, and 6,971
respectively.
101. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229 et seq. (1992).
102. 17 C.F.R. §§ 210 et seq. (1992).
103. Eg., "F" series filers are not subject to Items 101-103,201,301-304, and 401-404 of Regulation S-K.
Some of the requirements of those sections are encompassed in a requirement that foreign issuers provide
information required under Part 1 and Item 18 of Form 20-F. Part 1 and Item 18 of Form 20-F require that
information similar to the above mentioned Reg. S-K requirements be furnished, but those requirements are
much less extensive, particularly with regard to financial statements.
104. 17 C.F.R. § 229.202(0 (1992).
105. let
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requires."° However, if the foreign issuer is subject to the periodic reporting requirements
of the Securities Exchange Act, it may substitute periodic filings to satisfy the Item 2
requirements. " The registrant must also certify that the information filed pursuant to Item
2 is open for inspection and copying by all ADR holders.
10 8
Item 3 specifies the necessary supporting exhibits, which include:
(1) copies of all applicable deposit agreements and any other related
agreements or contracts entered into between the depositary and the issuer
within the preceding three years;
(2) an opinion of counsel certifying the legality of the securities being
registered, including a statement that the ADR holders will be entitled to
the rights specified in connection with the ADRs; and
(3) the name of any dealer known to have deposited shares against the ADRs
within the preceding six months or who has assisted or participated in the
proposed ADR plan."°
Item 4, which relates to undertakings, requires the depositary to report semiannually the
number of shares represented by the ADRs issued during the reporting period, the number
of shares represented by ADRs retired during the reporting period, the total number of shares
evidenced by ADRs still outstanding, and the total number of ADR holders at the end of the
reporting period."' The depositary must also report all dealers who deposit shares against
the ADRs during the reporting period."' Item 4 further requires the depositary to permit
the inspection of any reports or other communications from the issuer by all ADR
holders."' Finally, Item 4 requires notification of the depositary's fee schedule and a
description of the services provided in return for the fees." 3
2. The Underlying Securities: Regulation 12g3-2 Exemptions
Certain securities and qualified foreign issuers are exempt from registration
requirements under Regulation 240.12g3-2." 4 The differences between ADR registration
106. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
107. Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 7003.






114. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) Securities of any class issued by any foreign private issuer shall be exempt from section 12(g)
of the Act if the class has fewer than 300 holders resident in the United States ....
(b)(1) Securities of any foreign private issuer shall be exempt from section 12(g) of the Act if the
issuer, or a government official or agency of the country of the issuer's domicile or in which it is
incorporated or organized:
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and registration of domestic securities stem from the rather tedious regulations which apply
to the two forms of registration. The limited reporting requirements of ADR registrations
become apparent when they are compared with the registration of the securities underlying
the ADRs.
For example, F series filers are not subject to Items 101-103,15 201,116 301-304,17
and 401-404"' of Regulation S-K. However, a requirement that foreign issuers provide
the information required under Part 1119 and Item 1812 of Form 20-F encompasses some
(i) Shall fumish to the Commission whatever information in each of the following
categories the issuer since the beginning of its last fiscal year (A) has made or is required
to make public pursuant to the law of the country of its domicile or in which it is
incorporated or organized, (B) has filed or is required to file with a stock exchange on
which its securities are traded and which was made public by such exchange, or (C) has
distributed or is required to distribute to its security holders;
(ii) Shall furnish to the Commission a list identifying the information referred to in
paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section and stating when and by whom it is required to be made
public, filed with any such exchange, or distributed to security holders.;
(iii) Shall furnish to the Commission, during each subsequent fiscal year, whatever
information is made public as described in paragraphs (b)(1)(i)(A), (B) or (C) of this
section promptly after such information is made or required to be made public as
described therein;
(iv) Shall, promptly after the end of any fiscal year in which any changes occur in the
kind of information required to be published as referred to in the list furnished under
paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this section or any subsequent list, furnish to the Commission a
revised list reflecting such changes; and
(v) Shall furnish to the Commission in connection with the initial submission the
following information to the extent known or which can be obtained without unreasonable
effort or expense: the number of holders of each class of equity securities resident in the
United States, the amount and percentage of each class of outstanding equity securities
held by residents in the United States, the circumstances in which such securities were
acquired, and the date and circumstances of the most recent public distribution of
securities by the issuer or an affiliate thereof.
17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2 (1992).
115. Item 101 refers to the description of the business. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101 (1992). Items 102 refers to
the description of property owned by the business. 17 C.F.R. § 229.102 (1992). Item 103 refers to the description
of legal proceedings pending against the company. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1992).
116. Item 201 refers to the market price of the common equity shares and dividends paid on those shares.
17 C.F.R. § 229.203 (1992).
117. Item 301 refers to selected financial reports. 17 C.F.RL § 229.301 (1992). Item 302 refers to quarterly
supplemental financial data. 17 C.F.R. § 229.302 (1992). Item 303 requires the submission of the management's
discussion and analysis of the financial condition of the company. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (1992). Item 304 refers
to changes in, and disagreements with, accountants on accounting and financial disclosure. 17 C.F.R. § 229.304
(1992).
118. Item 401 requires a list of all directors, executive officers, promoters, and control persons. 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.401 (1992). Item 402 requires notification of any executive compensation schedule. 17 C.F.R § 229.402
(1992). Item 403 requires a list of security ownership of certain beneficial owners and management. 17 C.F.RL
§ 229.403 (1992). Item 404 requires the disclosure of certain relationships and related transactions. 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.404 (1992).
119. Part I of Form 20-F sets out virtually the identical requirements as in Item 101 of the "S" series
reporting forms. In addition, Part 1 of Form 20-F requires a description of the principal products and/or services
rendered and a breakdown of sales and revenue for the preceding three years. 17 C.F.R. § 249.220(f) (1992).
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of the requirements of those sections. Part 1 and Item 18 of Form 20-F require that
information similar to the Regulation S-K requirements just enumerated be furnished, but
those requirements can be much less extensive, particularly with regard to financial
statements.
21
Under certain circumstances foreign securities, and qualified foreign issuers, may be
exempt from SEC registration requirements under Regulation 240.12g3-2.12 2 Subpart (a)
of Regulation 12g3-2 is primarily a small-issuer exemption for foreign private issuers with
less than 300 U.S. shareholders of the class of securities issued. 123 Additionally, foreign
private issuers are exempt from registration if the issuer or appropriate government agency
furnishes to the SEC any information (1) required to be made public in accordance with the
law of the home country," (2) filed or required to be filed with any stock exchange on
which the issuer's securities are listed or required to be made public by the rules of such
exchange, and (3) distributed or required to be distributed to its shareholders."s At the end
of each fiscal year, the foreign issuer must supply updates of the information required
above. 26 The foreign issuer must also file reports, "to the extent known or which can be
obtained without unreasonable effort or expense.. .," including, (1) the number of U.S.
shareholders of each class of equity securities, (2) the amount and percentage of each class
of outstanding equity securities held in the U.S., (3) the circumstances of how the U.S.
securities holders acquired their shares, and (4) the date and circumstances surrounding the
issuer's most recent public distribution. 7 Thus, the SEC's framework for registration is
not a true exemption, but rather, it relies heavily on regulatory filings and distribution
documentation of the home country of foreign issuers.
V. THE LAB=rrY MYSTERY: WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR
REGISTRATION AND TRANSACTION INTEGRITY?
A. Introduction
In order for the SEC to operate in accord with the design of the Securities Acts, the
application of those acts' remedial provisions must be clear and workable. Toward this end,
the securities acts provide a framework for giving investors redress against the wrongful
conduct of a variety of parties who engage in the various aspects of securities transactions.
However, in the ADR process, the various roles of the parties involved can be as nebulous
as the ADR arrangements themselves. The identification of who may be responsible for the
120. Item 18 of Form 20-F requires the registrant to submit financial statements and accountant's
certificates as would be required by Form 10 or 10-K with some sections excepted. Item 18 further requires that
the financial statements disclose "substantially similar" information as U.S. financial statements prepared under
the GAAP rules and Regulation S-X. The registrant may, in preparing the financial data, comport with the rules
of GAAP or, in the alternative, use some other uniformly accepted accounting standards, if: (1) those standards
are prominently set out at the beginning of the financial statement, and (2) a discussion is included covering the
accounting principles used and the variations from GAAP and Regulation S-X. See 4 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
29,701 at 29,724.
121. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 229 et seq. (1992) with 17 C.F.R. § 210 et seq. (1992).
122. See supra note 114 (setting forth the relevant text of 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2 (1992)).
123. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(a) (1992).
124. Le., where the issuer is organized.
125. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b)(1)(i) (1992).
126. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b)(1)(ii)(1992).
127. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b)(1)(v) (1992).
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accuracy and integrity of the registration of ADRs, and for the ADR transactions, depends
on a two-factor standard: reliance and causation.
The approach of using such a two-factor standard arguably retreats to the common law
fraud proofs employed before the passage of the Securities Acts. Indeed, the 1933 Act was
designed, in part, to eliminate the necessity of proving reliance, privity, and causation.
However, as will be discussed, the Securities Acts, as interpreted by the courts, place liability
on six main groups of participants in securities registration and subsequent transactions: 128
128. Under the 1933 Act, several sections provide civil remedies that could be applicable in the ADR case
setting. Particularly, Sections 11 and 12(2) have provisions that may well stem to the ADR arrangement,
however, these provisions are by no means clear or all encompassing. Section 11 of the Securities Act provides
a civil right of action against a variety of participants in the registration process, including issuers, non-issuers
who sign the registration statement, experts participating in the registration, and underwriters. Section 11
provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) ... In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective, contained
an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein
or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, any person acquiring such security
(unless it is proved that at the time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may,
either at law or in equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue -
(1) every person who signed the registration statement;
(2) every person who was a director of (or person performing similar functions) or partner in, the
issuer at the time of the filing of the part of the registration statement with respect to which his
liability is asserted;
(3) every person who, with his consent, is named in the registration statement as being or about to
become a director, person performing similar functions, or partner,
(4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession gives authority to a
statement made by him, who has with his consent been named as having prepared or certified any
part of the registration statement, or having prepared or certified any report on valuation which is
used in connection with the registration statement, with respect to the statement, in such registration
statement, report, or valuation, which purports to have been prepared or certified by him;
(5) every underwriter with respect to such security.
15 U.S.C.S. § 77k(a) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
Section 17 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.S. 77q, also outlines liability provisions regarding fraud in
securities. Section 17(a) provides that:
... It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of any means
or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails,
directly or indirectly -
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any
omission, to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C.S. 77q(a) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
However, a great controversy surrounds whether a private right of action exists under this section. There
is no express right granted in Section 17, and there is a vast split whether an implied right exists. The generally
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 6
(1) issuers, (2) officers and directors, actual and potential,12 9 (3) persons who sign the
registration statement, (4) experts,130 (5) underwriters, and (6) collateral participants.
Analysis of where liability affixes in ADR transactions therefore requires placing the
participants in these categories.
Various approaches to the formation of the ADR arrangement are possible. For the
purposes of this discussion, two are of primary importance. The first is the situation where
the foreign issuer participates simultaneously in the U.S. registration and distribution of the
underlying securities, and the second is where there is not simultaneous U.S. registration and
distribution. In the first situation, the foreign issuer logically and reasonably should be
required to sign the registration as issuer of the ADR. In this case, issuer liability inevitably
attaches to the foreign issuer with regard to the registration of the securities underlying the
ADR. However, liability for the ADR registration itself may or may not apply. In the
second situation where there is no simultaneous registration of the underlying securities, the
foreign issuer may not be involved with the ADR registrations. In this situation, the
depositary bank assumes the role of primary manager of the ADR arrangement. The liability
confusion surfaces under both these ADR arrangements.
To find a viable means of protecting investors and affixing liability in the ADR
arrangement, the importance of the ADR registration statement and the particular relevance
of the reliance and causation standards must be recognized. Where there is no simultaneous
U.S. registration of the securities underlying the ADR, investors rely even more on the
information in the Form F-6 ADR registration statement. However, the imposition of strict
liability for the contents of the F-6 registration statement on the depositary bank solely on
the basis of the bank's participation appears overreaching,' 3 and it would discourage
banks from further participation. By imposing the burden of proving causation, depositary
banks would be subject to liability only for misstatements or omissions linked directly to the
investor's injury. An analysis of the various approaches to liability under the Securities Acts
should superimpose the role of the depositary bank over the various approaches to liability
that may apply to the ADR arrangement. This Article addresses such an analysis.
accepted view is that no private right of action exists under Section 17. Because of the controversial nature of
Section 17 liability in domestic securities actions, potential liability under that section, as it could possibly apply
to the ADR arrangement, is not discussed in this article. It is the author's belief that such a discussion would
be inconsequential.
129. Since a fcreign issuer would be subject to issuer liability if the underlying securities are
simultaneously issued in the United States, and there is no "issuer" liability with regard to the ADR registration,
the focus of the liability discussion is on the depositary bank. Assuming that the depositary bank is not an officer
or director of the foreign issuer, officer and director liability is not discussed.
130. 15 U.S.C.S. § 77k(4) provides for liability where experts certify portions of the registration statement.
However, a careful reading of that section indicates that a depositary bank is probably not within the definition
of experts for the purpose of this section. Therefore, expert liability is not discussed.
131. Part of the underlying problem of the issuer dilemma described above is not so much in finding a
remedy where misinformation is disseminated or fraud is perpetrated, but in the strictness of the provisions and
how they are applied. The root of the question is in the primary difference between issuer and non-issuer
liability. For example, in the traditional sense, Section 11 liability under the Securities Act focuses on issuer
liability and provides for secondary liability for conduct of non-issuers as well. Where issuers are generally held
to strict liability standards, non-issuers are subject to lesser standards. Thus, although there may be a variety of
collateral defendants subject to liability under Section 11, only the issuer is held to the high standard of strict
liability. Laven v. Flanagan, 695 F.Supp. 800, 811 (D.NJ. 1988); In re Worlds of Wonder Securities Litigation,
694 F.Supp. 1427, r434 (N.D. Cal. 1988), citing, Herman & MaeLean v. Huddleston 459 U.S. 375, 381, 103
S.Ct. 683, 687, 74 L.Ed.2d 548 (1983).
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B. Non-Issuers Who Sign the Registration Statement
Section 11 of the Securities Act provides a civil right of action against a variety of
participants in the registration process, including non-issuers who sign the registration
statement, experts who participate in the registration, and underwriters. Anyone who signs
the registration statement may be held liable for false or misleading statements in, or
omissions from, the registration statement. 32 When a depositary bank signs on behalf of
the fictitious entity created by the ADR arrangement, the bank logically should be subject
to liability under this clause. However, this appears to directly conflict with the SEC's
position on issuer status. The bank signs the registration statement merely as a ministerial
function and should therefore be free from liability based on that function. Acceptance of
the issuer status policy requires acceptance of the signature non-liability theory, too, a result
which further restricts a private right of action and decreases available remedies.
C. Underwriters
- Section 11 extends liability to underwriters who participate in ADR registration.1
33
The question arises whether a depositary bank can, or should, be considered an underwriter
for the purposes of liability. The term underwriter means any person who purchases
securities from an issuer with a view to distribution or who offers or sells securities for an
issuer, or who participates directly or indirectly in any such undertaking or the underwriting
of any such distribution. The term issuer, relative to underwriters, includes any person
directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer or any person under direct or
indirect common control with the issuer.
Although the definition of underwriters is broad, 34 the peculiar role of depositary
banks must be considered in light of these definitions. For example, underwriters have been
held to be persons who sell securities for the issuer,' 35 registration participants, 3 ' and
distribution managers. 37 The definition of underwriter is truly a situational definition: it
is not a definition based on an entity's general business activity. Rather, the essence of the
relationship between the parties illuminates their status. 38 For example, dealers who
dispose of stock and have particular knowledge of the background of the transactions may
be subject to underwriter status.139 Moreover, it is not necessary to establish that every
participant in the underwriting function had knowledge of all the facts and circumstances
132. 15 U.S.C.S. § 77k(a)(1) (1992).
133. 15 U.S.C.S. § 77k(5) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
134. 15 U.S.C.S. § 77b(II) (Law. Co-op. 1991).
135. In Securities & Exch. Comm'n. v. Chinese ConsoL Benev., 120 F.2d 738 (1941), members of a
Chinese benevolent society who gratuitously undertook to solicit orders for the purchase of Chinese government
bonds were held to be underwriters.
136. Although participation in the sale is an indirect approach to applying underwriter status to others who
may be involved in the transaction, liability is not necessarily dependant on underwriter status. The "participation
theory" is discussed more fully infra, at notes 145-58, and accompanying text.
137. Dealers are generally exempt from underwriter status, and thus not generally subject to underwriter
liability. However, if a dealer crosses that line between dealer and underwriter by managing the distribution, the
dealer is also classified as an underwriter. See Section 2(11), 15 U.S.C.S. § 77k (Law. Co-op. 1991).
138. 2 Loss & SELIOMAN, supra note 12, at 1109.
139. Securities & Exch. Comm'n. v. Micro-Moisture Controls, Inc., 167 F.Supp. 716 (D.C.N.Y. 1958),
affkLa 270 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959).
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surrounding the distribution. 4 Both direct and indirect participation, without such
detailed information, do not relieve a participant from underwriter status for the purposes of
liability.141 Mere participation through coordinating listings of the distribution on behalf
of the underwriter has been held to subject the participant to underwriter liability,'42 and
SEC policy potentially subjects even affiliated bookkeepers of the issuer who perform
strictly administrative functions to liability as underwriters.
43
Looking more closely at the depositary bank in the ADR arrangement, it is questionable
whether the bank is purchasing from an issuer with a view to distribution of the security so
that underwriter liability can attach. The bank's acceptance of the deposits of the foreign
securities and subsequent issuance of the depositary receipts may theoretically qualify as a
sales transaction on behalf of the issuer for underwriter status. However, although various
exchanges of stock have been held as qualifying transactions, the transaction is too far
removed from the contemplated purchase and sale arrangements to investors to fall within
the frameworkofthis section. Thus, the status of underwriter, based upon the purchase with
a view to distribution theory, should not apply to bank depositaries.
McFarland v. Memorex Corp.144 lends support to this conclusion. In this case,
warrant holders who never owned the underlying shares but who also sold their unexercised
warrants to underwriters were held not to be underwriters. The McFarland court reached
this holding because the warrant holders bore no risk in the particular arrangement and
because there would have been no recourse against them if the underwriters could not
subsequently sell the warrants. With ADR arrangements, such as with the warrant holders,
the depositary is a behind the scenes participant and should not be subject to underwriter
liability.
D. Collateral Participants
As the judicial definition of underwriter sometimes considers participants in sales
transactions to be underwriters of sellers for application of Section 11 liability, 45 courts
have also broadened the scope of liability under Section 12 by applying the participation
theory. This theory subjects anyone who participates in some significant way in the sales
effort of securities to liability.' The authority broadening liability to participants derives
from a long line of cases involving Section 12 liability. 47 The participation theory at first
appears to provide an ample basis to impose liability on depositary banks who participate in
the ADR transaction between the depositor, the depositary, and the investor, but applying




143. Securities Act of 1933, Rel. No. 5515, July 22, 1974, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 79,907.
144. 493 F.Supp. 631 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
145. 15 U.S.C.S. § 77k (Law. Co-op. 1991).
146. Canizaro v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 370 F.Supp. 282, 287 (E.D. La. 1974).
147. For the statutory provisions of Section 12(2) liability, see note 128. For a complete historical and
legislative analysis of the participation theory, see Abrams, The Scope of Liability Under Section 12 of the
Securities Act of 1933: "Participation ' and the Pertinent Legislative Materials, 15 FORDHAM URn. LJ. 877,
878 (1987).
1993 / Exploring American Depositary Receipts
The innate difficulty in the participation theory lies in defining its parameters. In
Wonneman v. Stratford Securities Co., the court succinctly posed the riddle:
What constitutes "participation?" Does one who supervises the selling operations
"participate" in an individual sale? Does one who composes advertising material
"participate" in the sale? Does.a director or an officer "participate" in the sale?149
Opposing decisions split on the basis of function versus construction further complicate the
application of the participation theory. On the one hand, courts have held that "the securities
laws are remedial and are to be construed liberally in order to achieve the congressional
purpose." 5 On the other hand, some courts, following the lead of the Supreme Court,
have held that generic necessities underlying interpretation of the "remedial purposes" of the
Securities Acts do not justify overbroad application of the language and the statutory
scheme.'
Somewhere between these two poles, the participation theory was redefined and
received general acceptance as a principle based on a substantial factor test. 52 In 1973,
the Fifth Circuit adopted the substantial factor test,'53 shifting from the but-for standard
148. [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), 190,923 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1959), 91,034
(S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1961).
149. Wonneman v. Stratford Sec. Co., [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,923,
at 92,963.
150. Freed v. Szabo Food Serv., Inc., [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,317
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 1964); see also Lannerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59, 64 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
151. McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 493 F.Supp. 631 (N.D. Cal. 1980), citing Securities and Exch.
Comm'n v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 116,98 S.CL 1702, 1711,56 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 200, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 1384, 47 L.Ed.2d 668 (1976, reh'g. denied. 425 U.S. 986, 96 S.Ct. 2194).
The McFarland court further stated that "[t]he ultimate question is one of congressional intent, not one of
whether [the] Court thinks that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law.....,
citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 2490, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979). Moreover,
the court noted that the Supreme Court has instructed that 'the securities acts are not to be interpreted as a
federal common law of securities and that traditional rules of strict construction apply." McFarland, 493 F.Supp.
631, citing Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11,100 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1974);
Touche Ross, 442 U.S. 560; Sloan, 436 U.S. 103; Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 97 S.Ct. 1292,
51 L.Ed.2d 480 (1977); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. 185; Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
95 S.Ct. 1917, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975).
152. In 1964, Lannerth, 234 F.Supp. 59, was decided. Refining the participation approach, the Lannerth
court noted that the proper application must lie somewhere between the narrow view that only the actual parties
to the sale would be subject to liability, i.e., strict privity, and the "too-liberal view" that anyone who "remotely
participated in the events leading to the transaction" would be subject to liability. The Lannerth court described
the standard in terms of tort law:
[wie think that the line of demarcation must be drawn in terms of cause and effect: Two borrow a
phrase from the law of negligence, did the injury to the plaintiff flow directly and proximately from
the actions of this particular defendant? If the answer is in the affirmative, we would hold him liable.
But for the presence of the defendant ... in the negotiations preceding the sale, could the sale have
been consummated? If the answer is in the negative, and we find that the transaction could never
have materialized without the efforts of [the] defendant, we must find him guilty.
Id. at 65. Stated another way, "[t]he hunter who seduces the prey and leads it to the trap he has set is no less
guilty than the hunter whose hand springs the snare." Id. See Hill York Corp. v. Amer. Int'l Franchises, Inc.,
448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971).
153. Lewis v. Walston, 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973).
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applied in earlier cases.154 This approach subjects any participant whose conduct was a
substantial factor in consummating a transaction to liability.155
The Supreme Court in Pinter v. Dah1156 specifically rejected the substantial factor test
with regard to Section 12 claims. In rejecting the test's application to Section 12 actions, the
Court noted, however, that collateral participation liability is not inappropriate in all
securities actions. In the Court's view,
Congress knew of the collateral participation concept and employed it in the
Securities Act and throughout its unified program of securities regulation.
Liabilities and obligations expressly grounded in participation are found elsewhere
in the Act.
15 7
The Court reasoned that Congress designed Section 12 specifically as a strict liability
provision aimed at controlling sellers by its rigid application. The difficulty in applying the
test in Section 12 actions existed because the test was too expansive and opposed the strict
definition of seller intended by Congress. The Court believed that application of the test in
Section 12 actions would subject securities professionals
whose involvement is only the performance of their professional services, to
[Section] 12(1.) strict liability ... [while the] buyer does not, in any meaningful
sense, purchas[e] the security from such person.
158
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's rejection of the substantial factor test for Section 12
claims, the test remains a workable standard in other securities actions.
Although the depositary bank in the ADR arrangement does not fit perfectly into the
framework of the participation theory, the overall application of the theory could be
reasonably workable. Where the depositary coordinates the efforts and resources of the
depositor to effect the F-6 registration, it serves as a direct link between the depositor and
the investor. Inasmuch as the underwriter is a necessary link in accomplishing domestic
154. Hill York Corp., 558 F.2d 680; Lannerth, 234 F.Supp. 59.
155. Lewis, 487 F.2d at 621-22. See Swenson v. Engelstad, 626 F.2d 421,426-27 (5th Cir. 1980); Pharo
v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 667 (5th Cir. 1980); Hill York Corp., 558 F.2d at 692-93; Adalman v. Baker, Watts &
Co., 807 F.2d 359, 363 (4th Cir. 1986) (Section 12 liability extends to any person who "is a 'significant
participant'in, or one who 'proximately caused,' a sale of securities .... Whether a participant is "a 'seller'
of securities should be determined by whether the [participant's conduct] was a 'substantial factor' in the sale
of securities."); Davis v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 739 F.2d 1057, 1067 (6th Cir. 1984). Some courts have
narrowed the application of the test by also requiring proof of scienter on the part of the collateral participant
[Akerman v. Oryx Communications, Inc., 8 10 F.2d 336, 344 (2d Cir. 1987); Mayer v. Oil Field Sys. Corp., 803
F.2d 749, 756 (2d Cir. 1986)] or that some special relationship exist between the collateral participant and the
purchaser [Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110, 113 (3rd Cir. 1979)].
156. 486 U.S. 622, 108 S.Ct. 2063, 2079-81, 100 L.Ed.2d 658 (1988), vacating Dahl v. Pinter, 787 F.2d
985 (5th Cir. 1986). Although Pinter specifically involved claims under Section 12(1), i.e., offers or sales of
securities in violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act, it has been uniformly held by lower courts that Pinter
applies to Section 12(2) actions as well. Mercer v. Jaffe, Snider, Raitt & Heuer, P.C., 713 F.Supp. 1019, 1024
(W.D. Mich. 1989), citing Wilson v. Saintine Exploration & Drilling Corp. 872 F.2d 1124, 1126-27 (2d Cir.
1989); Schlifke v. Sealirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935,940 (7th Cir. 1989); Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104,
1115 (5th Cir. 1988).
157. Pinter v. Didl, supra note 156, at 2080 n.26.
158. Id at 2081.
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offerings, the depositary must function in a similar role whose absence would make the ADR
arrangement impossible. The depositary's role is a substantial one and, although the
depositary is not the immediate and direct seller of the underlying security, it functions as
the trading liaison between depositor and investor. Moreover, the depositary is both a
benefactor and beneficiary in the ADR arrangement: it acts as a facilitator in the exchanges
of deposited securities and receipts issued, and it receives fees for performing those
functions. Therefore, it would not be unreasonable to apply the participation model to the
ADR arrangement and require the depositary bank to adhere to appropriate standards of
responsibility for that participation.
E. Section 12(2)
The focal point of Section 12(2) liability is the offer or sale of securities by means of a
prospectus or oral communication that includes an untrue statement or omits a material
fact. t59 Liability under Section 12(2) extends to brokers, dealers, and others who
participate in the sales transactions of securities. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's
holding in Pinter, liability under Section 12(2) can nevertheless apply under some non-
traditional circimstances. Section 12 typically applies to broker-dealers, and the all-
important offer or sale is the liability trigger. Further, the Supreme Court's analysis tends
to address the potential liability of far-removed defendant participants in the offer or sale of
securities. However, certain applications of the section could include depositary banks
within its liability umbrella.
The definition of broker-dealer is broad enough to expose a depositary bank to liability
under Section 12(2).'6' The Supreme Court's reasoning in Pinter, rejecting the substantial
factor test, was an effort to protect remote participants in securities sales transactions. The
Court clearly identified the problems of accurately defining the parameters of the substantial
factor test, arguing that
[t]he test affords no guidelines for distinguishing between the defendant whose
conduct rises to a level of significance to trigger seller status and the defendant
whose conduct is not sufficiently integral to the sale. None of the courts employing
159. 15 U.S.C.S. § 771(2) (Law. Co-op. 1991) provides:
Any person who: ....
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of section 3 [15 U.S.C.S.
§ 77c], other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) thereof, by the use of any means or instruments
of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus
or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who
shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing such
security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to
recover the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income
received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
160. 15 U.S.C.S. § 77b(12) (Law. Co-op. 1991) defines a dealer as "any person who engages either for
all or part of this time, directly or indirectly, as agent broker, or principal, in the business of offering, buying,
selling, or otherwise dealing or trading in securities issued by another person.-
The Transnational Lawyer Vol. 6
the approach has articulated what measure of participation qualified a person for
seller status, and logically sound limitations would be difficult to develop.""
The Court creates another judicial cliff-hanger, however, by rejecting the substantial
factor test. The Court states in its conclusion that "merely a substantial factor in causing the
sale of unregistered securities is not sufficient in itself to render the defendant liable.. .,162
but it offers no suggestion on what standard may be appropriate or what participants may be
tested under such a standard. In declining to offer even a trace of advice about the proper
analytical approach, the Court fails to acknowledge that, under certain circumstances, the test
could be adequately defined. By applying the substantial factor test in terms of the closely
scrutinized role of a participant, coupled with statutory definitions of collateral participants,
the result would be a workable standard adequate to accommodate most circumstances. The
role of the depositary bank in the ADR arrangement, coupled with the statutory definition
of dealer, is such a circumstance. When a depositary bank accepts a deposit of foreign
securities andsubsequently issues the correspondingreceipts, it fits well within the statutory
framework of dealers who are subject to Section 12(2) liability. When the role of a
depositary bank is scrutinized under the rubric of participation, there should be little question
that Section 12(2) applies.
In 1985, the Ninth Circuit fashioned its own version of the substantial factor test. In
Anderson v. Aurotek,163 the court imposed Section 12 liability on participants in the sales
of securities whose "acts are 'both necessary to and a substantial factor in the sales
transaction.'"164 The same principle was further defined in 1986 as a two-prong test in SEC
v. Rogers.'65 The first prong of the test requires that the participation be a but-for cause
in the outcome; 65 the second prong requires that the participation be more than de
minimis.' 67 The Rogers court explained that substantial participation was a standard
without precise bounds, but it proceeded to clarify the two-prong test; giving additional
substance to the prior standard.
Applying the combined concepts of Aurotek and Rogers to the ADR participation
arrangement leaves little room for error in finding potential liability with regard to the role
of the depositary banks. First, as discussed above, the banks' participation is clearly within
the statutory definition of dealer because the bank acts at least indirectly as the agent or
broker of the depositor, whether a foreign issuer or other shareholder, by accepting the
deposits and subsequently offering the corresponding depositary receipts. Second, the ADR
arrangement could not function but for the participation of the bank. Finally, although the
bank's participation is, arguably, only a ministerial function, in reality that participation is
far more than merely de minimis: the bank's role is central to the ADR arrangement.
Therefore, applying the modified Aurotek-Rogers test to the ADR circumstances results in
a workable and predictable model.
161. Pinter v. Dahl, supra note 156, at 2081 (citations omitted). It may be fitting to apply Justice Stewart's
famous test for obscenity, "I know it when I see it.. . ." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197, 84 S.Ct. 1676,
1683, 12 L.Ed.2d 793 (1964).
162. Pinter v. DEtlI, supra note 156, at 2082.
163. 774 F.2d. 927 (9th Cir. 1985).
164. 774 F.2d at 930, citing SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 649-50 (9th Cir. 1980).
165. 790 F.2d 1450, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986).
166. Id
167. Id
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The modified Aurotek-Rogers test arguably introduces principles of causation and
reliance into the securities liability framework, but such a proposal is contrary to the
sentiments of the Supreme Court. In Pinter, the Court repudiated Congress' intent to
incorporate principles of tort law doctrine, that is, reliance and causation, into Section 12
liability,"" arguing that such an incorporation would create too much uncertainty and
produce unpredictable results.' 69 However, taking the analysis of the modified Aurotek-
Rogers test a step further, the concept is equivalent to causation and reliance, but with a
stronger foothold. When an ADR holder relies on the ADR registration information
coordinated by the depositary bank with the depositor, and when the bank permits the
disclosure of untrue statements or omits material facts from that registration, the
requirements of reliance and causation are established, with the modified Aurotek-Rogers
test also satisfied. The introduction of reliance and causation would therefore pinpoint
liability, rather than create the abstract standard that the Supreme Court warned against.'7"
F. Aiding andA betting Under Section 18 of the Securities Act and 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act
Aiding and abetting liability is probably the most promising remedial theory to apply
to participants in the ADR arrangement. A plaintiff must prove three elements to establish
aiding and abetting in a securities action: (1) that an underlying securities violation has been
committed, (2) that the aider and abettor had knowledge of the violation, and (3) that the
aider and abettor substantially and knowingly participated in the violation.' 1 The potential
liability of depositary banks under Sections 18 and 10(b) under the aiding and abetting theory
is discussed next.
17 2
168. Pinter v. Dahl, supra note 156, at 2081.
169. Id.
170. A second area of ambiguity in application of Section 12(2) liability is whether liability extends only
to initial distributions or also to secondary issues. See generally DAvID LInroN, 15 BRoKER-DEALER
REoULATION 3-201 (1989) (Rel. #1, 9/89). The language of the statute is broad in that liability extends to any
person who "offers or sells a security" without any reference to whether Congress contemplated only primary
distributions or whether secondary trading was also within the intended class of transactions. In analyzing the
intent of Congress on this point, some courts believe that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 deals specifically
with "post distribution trading" and that Section 12(2) of the Securities Act should be restricted to primary
distribution. See Strong v. Webber, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). Apparently there are no cases that have
been decided on this precise issue. The question prompts an analysis of the ADR arrangement in terms of
classification as a primary or secondary issue. The issuance of the depositary receipts could be argued both ways.
This issue is, however, beyond the scope of this article.
171. Staffin v. Greenberg, 509 F.Supp. 825,833 (E.D. Pa. 1981), citing Monsen v. Consol. Dressed Beef
Co., Inc., 579 F.2d 793, 799 (3rd Cir. 1978), cert den. sub nom., [First Pennsylvania Bank N.A. v. Monsen]
439 U.S. 930, 99 S.Ct. 318, 58 L.Ed.2d 323; Keller v. Coyle, 499 F.Supp. 1031, 1033 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
172. Aiding and abetting claims have arisen on numerous occasions in Section 11 and 12 actions with
varied success. Although there have been decisions that have allowed aiding and abetting claims under Sections
II and 12, the trend, particularly in Section 11 claims, is contrary. See Ahem v. Gaussoin, 611 F.Supp. 1465,
1482 (D.C. Ore. 1985) (holding plaintiff cannot use aiding and abetting theory in connection with Section 11
claims); In re Flight Transp. Corp. Sec. Litigation, 593 F.Supp. 612, 616 (D. Minn. 1984) (the Supreme Court
has adopted a narrow construction of Section 11..., an aiding and abetting theory under Section 11 must fail);
see also In re Worlds of Wonder Securities Litigation, supra note 131; In re Equity Funding Corp. of Amer. Sec.
Litigation, 416 F.Supp. 161 (C.D. Cal. 1976); McFarland v. Memorex, supra note 144; Bresson v. Thomson,
641 F.Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Elsinct, Ltd., Securities Litigation, 674 F.Supp. 374 (D. Mass. 1987);
but see Laven v. Flanagan, supra note 131, at 808; Zatkin v. Primeth, 551 F.Supp. 39 (S.D. Cal. 1982).
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1. Aiding and Abetting: Section 18
Section 18 of the Securities Act extends liability to any person who makes false or
misleading statements in any application, report, registration, or other document filed
pursuant to securities registration and reporting requirements."' Due to Section 18's broad
language, aiding and abetting liability is compatible with the rudiments of Section 18. At
least one court has held that Section 18 "is the catch-all civil liability provision for all of the
reporting requirements of the Exchange Act .... ""
Although few cases are litigated under Section 18, any liability arising in connection
with false or misleading statements in an ADR registration would appear to fit precisely
within the conceptual frameworkof Section 18. The ADR registration statement clearly lies
within the statutory requirements of a Section 18 claim. Moreover, the breadth of Section
18's language is sufficiently broad to subject a depositary bank participating in the collection
of data, the coordination of data, or both for an ADR registration to liability as a principal
participant in the registration.17 Even when it may not be the principal participant, ADR
investors rely on the bank as having the means, if not the motivation, to reasonably ensure
the integrity of the registration statement. As the coordinator of the ADR registration, that
is, the liaison between depositor and investor, the depositary sits in a prime position for aider
and abettor liability under Section 18 upon the establishment of its defined elements.
Although Section 18 claims can be difficult to prove, the peculiar circumstances of the
ADR relationship between parties may help overcome the difficulty. A key element of a
Section 18 action is the requirement of reliance."7 6 Although the required quantum of
Aiding and abetting under Section 12 claims has also met with scattered success. The fi st case approving
Section 12 aiding and abetting liability was in re Ceasar's Palace Securities Litigation, 360 F.Supp. 366
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). That decision was followed by several circuits approving aider and abettor liability under
Section 12. See generally Sandusky Land, Ltd. v. Uniplan Groups, Inc., 400 F.Supp. 440 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Stem
v. American Bankshares Corp., 429 F.Supp. 8181 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Kilmartin v. H.C. Wainwright & Co., 637
F.Supp. 938 (D. Mass. 1986). However, several other courts have rejected Section 12 aider and abettor liability.
See generally In re Activision Securities Litigation, 621 F.Supp. 415 (N.D.Cal. 1985); Beck v. Cantor, Fitzgerald
& Co., 621 F.Supp. 1547 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Collins v. Signetics Corp. 605 F.2d 110 (3rd Cir. 1979).
In Pinter v. Dahl the Supreme Court noted the disparity of Section 12 application with regard to aiding
and abetting but did not consider that issue in reaching its decision. Pinter v. Dal, supra note 156, at 2079 n.24.
Because of the inconsistency in decisions considering aider and abettor liability under Sections 11 and 12, the
present discussion passes on further consideration here and focuses on Section 18 and 10(b) claims.
173. 15 U.S.C.S. § 78r (Law. Co-op. 1983 & Supp. 1992) provides in part:
(a) Persons liable; persons entitled to recover, defense of good faith; suit at law or in equity; costs,
etc. Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any application, report, or
documents filed pursuant to this title or any rule or regulation thereunder, or any undertaking
contained in a registration statement as provided in subsection (d) of section 15 of this title [15
U.S.C.S. § 78o(d)], which statement was at the time and in the light of the circumstances under
which it was made false or misleading with respect to any material fact shall be liable to any person
(not knowing that such statement was false or misleading) who, in reliance upon such statement, shall
have purchased or sold a security at a price which was affected by such statement, for damages
caused by such reliance, unless the person sued shall prove that he acted in good faith and had no
knowledge that such statement was false or misleading. A person seeking to enforce such liability
may sue at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction.
Id.
174. In re Penn Central Securities Litigation, 347 F.Supp. 1327, 1340 (D.C. Pa. 1972).
175. The relevant language is "any person who shall make or cause to be made... . Id. § 78r(a) (Law.
Co-op. 1983).
176. 15 U.S.C.S. § 78r(a) (Law. Co-op. 1983).
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reliance which an investor must prove is not entirely clear, proof of some reliance is
essential.177 Thus, although constructive reliance based on Section 11 and 12 may be
insufficient,178 the relationship between an ADR investor and the depositary bank makes
adequate reliance almost inevitable. The uniqueness and complexity of any aspect of
international investment compels investors to rely heavily on their depositary banks.
Therefore, what may be a problematic vehicle for liability in domestic securities actions may
be the preferred theory in ADR liability actions.
2. Aiding and Abetting: Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
In 1934, Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.179 One of the
milestones of that Act is Section 10(b)18 and the corresponding Rule 10b-5.18 The rule
prohibits a vast spectrum of roguish behavior.182 Of primary importance in the ADR
arrangement is that portion of the rule directed toward liability in circumstances where the
defendant is not directly involved with any purchase or sale of securities. The portions of
the rule that trigger liability in such circumstances are the phrases (1) "any person," (2)
"directly or indirectly," and (3) "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
177. Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp. 582 F.2d 259,269-70 (3rd Cir. 1978), cert. den. 439 U.S. 1129
(1979); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 130, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aftld, in part and rev'd.
in part on other grounds, 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
178. Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. den. 395 U.S. 903 (1969) (reliance in Section 11
action can be established "without proof of the reading" of the document); Mitchell & Co. v. Wachovia Bank
& Trust Co., N.A. 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Beebe v. Pacific Realty Trust, 99 F.R.D. 60, 70 (D. Ore. 1983).
179. 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 78a to 78hh-1 (Law. Co-op. 1983 & Supp. 1992).
180. 15 U.S.C.S. § 78j provides, in relevant part, as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality
or interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange -...
(b) To sue or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for protection of investors.
Il
181. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(1) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(3) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id
182. The Exchange Act is the foundation of 10(b) actions, but the Rule is the "workhorse" of 10(b) claims.
For this reason, discussion centers around the Rule rather than the authorizing legislation. Even separate
categories of 10b-5 violations have been identified: (1) misrepresentations and omissions by the defendant in
trading securities; (2) misstatements and concealed facts when the defendant i snot involved in the purchase or
sale transaction; (3) mismanagement by officers and directors; (4) market manipulation; (5) tipping; (6) tender
offers and exchange offers; and (7) activities of brokers and fiduciaries. 5 JACOBS, LrIGATION AND PRACTICE
UNDER RuLE 10-5 1-4, 2d Ed. (1990) (Rel. #24, 3/89).
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a. The "Any Person" Clause
The words any person, coupled with the tenets of aiding and abetting liability,
demonstrate Congress' intent to reach peripheral participants in fraudulent schemes." 3
The role of banks in potential securities actions reveals that they are squarely within the
scope of the clause as peripheral participants. For example, in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah
v. United States,'84 a bank was subject to 10(b) liability because its employees actively
encouraged the marketing of securities for which the bank was the registered transfer
agent.8 5 The bank employees' misrepresentation of variou§ aspects of the securities and
the bank's collateral participation in the transaction formed the bases of liability.!86
In another action, Mercer v. Jaffe, Snider, Raitt and Heuer, P.C.,87 the court extended
liability under Section 10(b) and the rule to those who "furnish information which contains
a material misstatement or omission..., so long as he or she is not so far removed from the
transmission of the misleading information that liability would necessarily become
vicarious." 88 Attorneys acting on behalf of their clients lied to a state securities
enforcement bureau about their client's unlawful activities, 8 9 and they additionally
approved or assisted in the preparation of false and misleading advertising and promotional
circulars used by their clients.' The Mercer court held that the attorneys' participation
"certainly qualifies as 'furnishing' or 'supplying' information to potential investors in a
sufficiently direct manner to impose lOb-5 primary liability."' 9 ' In the ADR arrangement,
the depositary bank is a necessary link between depositor and investor: it furnishes
information by coordinating the ADR registration and facilitates the transfer of the
depositary receipts. In this respect, the bank's role places it well within the group of
qualifying defendants for Section 10(b) liability.
b. The "Directly or Indirectly" Clause
Both Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 include the phrase directly or indirectly. The import
of the phrase is clear: it extends liability to behind the scenes players. 9 2 The extensive
scope of the clause makes it the primary activator of aiding and abetting liability under the
rule. Aiders and abettors have been held liable under the rule in an assortment of situations
183. See generally Id. at 2-391 (Rel. #14, 9/87).
184. 406 U.S. 128,92 S.Ct. 1456,31 L.Ed.2d 741 (1972), reh'g. denied, 407 U.S. 916,92 S.Ct. 2430,32
L.Ed.2d 692 (1972), reh'g. denied, 408 U.S. 931, 92 S.Ct. 2478, 33 L.Ed.2d 345 (1972).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. 713 F.Supp. 1019 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
188. Id. at 1025, citing SEC v. Washington Co. Utility Dist., 676 F.2d 218, 223-24 (6th Cir. 1982).
189. Id. at 1025.
190. Id.
191. Id citing SEC v. Washington Co. Utility Dis. at 223-24. The court also noted that these facts would
support "an alternative basis for imposing aider and abettor liability..." citing Moore v. Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d
2297 (6th Cir. 1987), cert den, sub nom. [Moore v. Frost] 483 U.S. 1006, 107 S.Ct. 3231, 97 L.Ed.2d 737
(1987).
192. See generally 5A JACOBS, supra note 182, at 2-433 (Rel. #14, 9/87).
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because application of the rule extends to ancillary participants. 9 3 At least one court has
held that direct communication between defendants, who were indirect participants in the
securities scheme, and the plaintiffs, is not necessary to impose 10b-5 liability. Rather,
anyone who knowingly assists another in making false or misleading statements is also
subject to liability.'94 Thus, a depositary bank's indirect participation by accepting the
deposits and subsequently issuing depositary receipts should bring it within the framework
of the directly and indirectly clause of the rule based on the depositary's constructive
knowledge of the registration contents.
c. The "In Connection With" Clause
The final piece of the triangle is the rule's in connection with clause. One of the
fundamental purposes of the clause is to define the perimeters of the rule. 93 A long line
of cases establishes the requirement of some nexus, albeit a loose association, between the
fraudulent conduct and the ultimate offer or sale.' 96 Although no authority sets forth a
definitive test for determining what this proximal nexus requires,197 some lower courts
have agreed that the connection requirement is satisfied if the fraudulent scheme "touches"
the transaction. 98 On the basis of a somewhat subtle lead of the Supreme Court, it follows
inferentially that no direct or close relationship between the plaintiffs and the participants
need be shown.'
9
Using the flexible nexus standard as a yardstick, collateral participants in ADR
registration should be subject to liability under the rule. For example, where a depositary
193. In Epprecht v. Delaware VaL Machinery, Inc. 407 F.Supp. 315 (E.D. Pa. 1976), the court expressed
its view that:
It must be emphasized that liability under Rule lOb-5 is not confined to those direct participants who
are primarily liable. Often, when an underlying securities fraud is proven, there are actors on the
fringe of the transaction who, depending on the degree of their involvement, may be secondarily
liable as either aiders or abettors or as co-conspirators.
l at 320. The court further noted that "liability may also be premised on an even more attenuated relation with
the underlying violation" where conspiracy is involved. lId
194. Jubran v. Musikahn Corp., 673 F.Supp. 108, 113 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), citing Freschi v. Grand Coal
Venture, 767 F.2d 1041, 1049 (2d Cir. 1985) (reversing lower court's holding that liability could be established
even where there was neither "knowing assistance" to another in communicating a misrepresentation nor direct
communication), vacated on other grounds, 478 U.S. 1015, 106 S.Ct. 3325, 92 L.Ed.2d 731 (1986), modified
on other grounds, 800 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1986).
195. See generally 5A JACOBS, supra note 182, at 2-41 (Rel. #13, 6/87).
196. Abrams v. Oppenheimer Gov't Sec., Inc., 737 F.2d 582, 593 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1981); Arrington v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 651 F.2d
615, 619 (9th Cir. 1981); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1028 (6th Cir. 1979); Davis v.
Davis, 526 F.2d 1286, 1290 (5th Cir. 1976).
197. One commentator has compiled a series of seven questions that should be considered in determining
whether the nexus requirement is satisfied: (1) whether the purchase or sale preceded the fraud; (2) did the
alleged fraud occur in the transaction the plaintiff is attacking or did it arise in some other transaction; (3) did
the fraud concern the terms of the securities transaction; (4) was the plaintiff a party to the fraudulent transaction
sale or purchase; (5) was plaintiff's loss closely connected to the fraud; (6) to what extent was the transaction
an integral part of the fraud; and (7) was the fraud calculated to lead to a securities transaction. 5A JACOBS,
supra note 182, at 2-47 to 2-49 (Rel. #13, 6/87).
198. Alley v. Miramon, 614 F.2d 1372, 1378 n.1 1 (C.A. La. 1980); Valente v. PepsiCo., Inc., 454 F. Supp.
1228, 1236 (D.C. Del. 1978).
199. Alley, 614 F.2d at 1378 n.11, citing Superintendent of Ins. of St. of N.Y. v. Bankers L. & C. Co.,
404 U.S. 6, 92 S.Ct. 165, 30 L.Ed.2d 128 (1971).
The Transnational Lawyerl Vol. 6
bank has knowledge that the registration statement contains false or misleading information,
the nexus linking the deception and the sale of the ADRs is both clear and significant.
Because the bank's role in the arrangement is central to the success of the undertaking, if the
bank has knowledge of an underlying deception, not only does its collateral and passive
participation touch the transaction, it likely reinforces the deception. The bank's unique
position may make it the final buffer between potential deception and a foiled attempt to
defraud.2 °°
G. From There to Here: The Search for a Workable Model Continues
A chief concern behind attempting to define a liability model for ADR participants is
the difficult task of fitting the remedy to the source of the problem it attempts to cure, that
is, identifying who should be accountable for the accuracy of the registration statements. In
this sense, the ADR holder is in a peculiar situation: it may look to a foreign issuer that may
or may not be involved in the ADR arrangement, or it may look only to a local bank, the
affiliated depositary bank, or both as the entities responsible for assembling the information
required in the F-6 registration form. If the foreign issuer does not participate in the ADR
arrangement, and if there is no simultaneous U.S. registration of the underlying securities,
there is an even greater importance placed on the accuracy of the information in Form F-6.
Thus, because issuer liability appears not to exist under the dual entity theory discussed
above, some remedy should be available to ADR investors who place so great a reliance on
the F-6 registration statement.
As discussed above, the SEC has taken the position that the depositary bank may sign
the ADR registration without incurring issuer status on behalf of the fictitious entity created
by the ADR arrangement. Therefore, issuer liability is inapplicable in the arrangement.
However, a close look at the role of the depositary bank suggests at least two possible
models of liability. First, a modifiedAurotek-Rogerstest, including the elements of reliance
and causation, fit the peculiar factual pattern of the ADR arrangement. Second, the broad
standards of Rule 10b-5, applied alone or through an aiding and abetting theory, clearly
encompass potential depositary liability. Both models would be workable and predictable.
The underlying fact that triggers liability under either test is whether the depositary bank
played a significant role in coordinating the registration information and in the registration
efforts. If the answer is affirmative, either test would result in the imposition of liability.
If the answer is negative, the depositary bank is free from registration liability to the ADR
participants.
VI. CONCLUSION
An understanding of the future of American Depositary Receipts demands a search of
some mysterious paths of regulation. If ADRs are to become a dynamic tool of international
finance, the banking industry and the securities industry must break the confusing regulatory
molds and seek to create better defined parameters. In relation to the regulations of banks
which issue ADRs, ADRs in theory compare to the discount brokerage service at issue in the
200. This is not to say that every participant in a securities transaction is obligated to police the
participation of every other player, but it is not too extreme to charge the parties involved with the responsibility
of prudence.
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Bank ofAmerica case. Much like discount brokerage services, ADRs are restricted to the
transfer of receipts for third parties. They implicate no issue, flotation, underwriting, or
distribution of securities. Likewise, the subtle hazards which Camp set forth do not exist.
Although ADRs implicate other risks, the risks are not the sort that should prevent banks
from handling the administrative functions of maintaining a registry of ADR holders.
A commentator recently stated that an analysis of the changes in the financial services
industry could well be titled "What in Heaven's Name Has Happened to Banking and Why
Are We Talking So Much About It?"" 1 The changes in the banking industry, considered
with changes in international finance and investment, are remarkable. Now, the banking and
securities institutions should serve international finance by a natural meld of their talent,
knowledge, and experience. By this combination, American investors will be able to grasp
opportunities previously unavailable. The ADR will then become a vehicle for international
investors to seek and realize financial gains, while participating banks expand their services
and attain their own growth. The coordinated efforts of the securities and banking industries
can protect investors from the pitfalls of unregulated offerings while satisfying their
customers' personal investment goals in the international markets. Finally, the flow of
capital beyond international boundaries will enhance multidirectional economic growth.
201. John D. Hawke, Jr., Introduction: Implications of Change in the Financial Services Industry, 8 ANN.
REv. BANKING L. 325 (1989).

